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Marriage and Dependence 
in Iowa and U.S. Law: 
Acuff v. Schmit, 1956 
KATE HOEY AND JOY SMITH 
ON THE AFTERNOON of July 15, 1953, Glen Acuff, a 32-year-
old construction worker, was permanently incapacitated when 
his Ford sedan was sideswiped by another car at the intersection 
of two gravel roads south of Waterloo, Iowa. The driver of the 
other car, Raymond Schmit, a bank teller from Gilbertville, Iowa, 
sustained a bump over his right eye. Glen’s neck was broken, 
which resulted in complete paralysis of his lower torso and legs, 
partial paralysis of his arms and hands, loss of bowel and blad-
der function, and loss of sexual function.1 He could no longer 
support his family. His wife, Maude, 31, was a full-time house-
wife and mother, caring for their four children, ages 4, 5, 7, and 
12. Without Glen’s income, the Acuffs initially got by with help 
from Glen’s father, state welfare payments, and the Salvation 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and guidance of Uni-
versity of Iowa professors Linda K. Kerber and Ann Estin. Research that Kate 
Hoey performed for Professor Peggie Smith, currently at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis, on the claim of loss of consortium led the authors to some of 
the sources and insights here. The authors thank all three professors. 
1. There are some contradictions in accounts of the accident. Fred Acuff, Glen’s 
youngest son, recalls that his father remembered that as he was making a left 
turn, Schmit attempted to pass him on the right and lost control of his vehicle, 
sideswiping Glen’s vehicle and pushing it into a telephone pole. Maude Acuff 
and Fred Acuff, interview by authors, Boone, Iowa, 3/28/2009. Attorney Fred-
erick White’s brief describes the two vehicles traveling in different directions 
and colliding at the intersection. Appellant’s Petition at Law, Acuff v. Schmit, 
248 Iowa 272 (Iowa 1956) (No. 10-48939), 3–6.  
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Army, where they were active members. Glen and Maude hired 
a young Waterloo attorney, Frederick G. White, to represent Glen 
in a personal injury suit. In November 1954, on the day Glen’s 
civil suit was to be heard before district court, Schmit’s insur-
ance company settled out of court. The Acuffs used the settle-
ment to pay Glen’s medical bills.2
 White did not forget the Acuffs. Early one morning the fol-
lowing spring, he was reading a legal periodical as he rocked 
his infant daughter. An article about Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 
a 1950 District of Columbia U.S. Court of Appeals decision, 
caught his attention.3 Lucia Hitaffer had successfully brought a 
loss of consortium claim against her husband’s employer to re-
cover damages after her husband suffered a job-related injury 
due to company negligence.4 Loss of consortium is a legal claim 
brought by a spouse when the other spouse, due to an injury, 
is unable to provide the full benefits of a marital relationship, 
including aid, affection, companionship, and sexual relations.5 
Hitaffer was significant because the court granted a claim to 
wives that previously had been granted only to husbands. As 
White read the synopsis of Hitaffer, he wondered if he could 
make the same claim in Iowa for Maude Acuff. If he won the 
case, Maude would receive acknowledgment of her loss and, 
perhaps, compensation.6  
                                                 
2. Acuffs interview. White sued for $57,000 and claimed that Glen’s injuries 
were the result of Schmit’s negligence (failure to yield, traveling at excessive 
speed, and failure to have his vehicle under control), and that Glen was free of 
contributory negligence. The liability limits of Schmit’s insurance and Schmit’s 
lack of personal assets resulted in a lower settlement. White recalls that the 
policy limit was about $10,000. Frederick G. White, telephone interview by 
authors, 4/7/2009; Waterloo Daily Courier, 9/18/1956. 
3. White interview. 
4. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). For a full citation 
and discussion of the Hitaffer case, see Marilyn Minzer et al., eds., Damages in 
Tort Actions, 10 vols. (Newark, NJ, 1982), 2:11.02[2][b], which notes that Hitaffer 
was overruled on other grounds by Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 
(D.C. Cir. 1957). 
5. Evans Holbrook, “The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,” Michigan 
Law Review 22 (1923), 2; Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, 
“Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium,” Columbia Law Re-
view 61 (1961), 1341; Kevin Lindsey, “A More Equitable Approach to Loss of 
Spousal Consortium,” Iowa Law Review 75 (1990), 714. 
6. White interview. 
Acuff v. Schmit      203 
 White, in his third year as a practicing attorney, had almost 
no trial experience when he read about Hitaffer. He knew it was 
a brash step for a young and inexperienced attorney to file a 
previously unrecognized claim. A colleague tried to discourage 
him, noting that at Drake University Law School he was taught 
that in Iowa wives could not claim loss of consortium based on 
negligence. But, as White thought about Hitaffer and researched 
Iowa law, he could find nothing to prevent him from bringing 
the claim. He consulted with Wendell Holmes, an experienced 
attorney he worked with in the county attorney’s office. Holmes 
agreed to sign on to the case as the senior attorney.7  
 The 1956 decision in Acuff v. Schmit, the case filed by White, 
established a wife’s right to claim loss of consortium. Yet the de-
cision rested on a traditional cultural commitment to marriage. 
Granting the loss of consortium claim to wives did extend mar-
ried women’s legal rights, but it did not represent a fundamen-
tal change in the courts’ view of the hierarchical relationship 
between husbands and wives. Case law suggests that judges 
continued to believe that husbands should support wives and 
continued to view wives as dependents responsible for the care 
of children and other family members. The historical evolution 
of loss of consortium claims exemplifies the significance of mar-
riage in structuring dependence in American society and illus-
trates the convoluted and sometimes halting process by which 
the courts aligned the law with changing cultural conceptions 
of marriage. The survival of the loss of consortium claim in the 
United States is closely tied to the story of the cultural signifi-
cance of marriage in mid–twentieth-century America.   
 
THE CLAIM for loss of consortium grew out of coverture, 
an English common law concept that the American colonies 
adopted. Under coverture, a woman lost her separate legal iden-
tity upon marriage.8 The husband and wife were one legal en-
tity under coverture, and the husband represented that legal 
                                                 
7. Ibid. 
8. Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law: From the 
Abridged Edition of Wm. Hardcastle Browne, ed. Bernard C. Gavit (Washington, 
DC, 1941), 189–90; Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (Cam-
bridge, MA, 2000), 115, 298–99. 
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entity. The wife was dependent on her husband for economic 
survival, and the husband was entitled to the wife’s services, 
such as childcare and cooking.9 Coverture was fundamental to 
the legal definition of marriage in the United States.  
 Marriage was the institution through which the state con-
trolled sexuality, managed labor, and responded to the depend-
ency needs of its citizens.10 Because marriage was viewed as a 
form of governance, husband over wife, cultural conceptions of 
marriage often reflected the dominant philosophy of political au-
thority. Coverture, which reduced wives to the status of chattel, 
was similar to the patriarchal paternalism that characterized the 
English monarch’s dominion over the colonies. With the estab-
lishment of the republic, people began to view marriage as a con-
tract in which husband and wife freely united for their economic 
benefit, security, and common interest. However, the hierarchical 
relationship implicit in the gendered roles of husband and wife 
did not shift. The legal construct of coverture remained intact.11  
 The claim for loss of consortium emerged in nineteenth-
century U.S. case law as courts sought to compensate a husband 
for loss of a wife’s services following a negligent injury to his 
wife.12 Until Hitaffer in 1950, courts consistently refused to grant 
wives a similar claim.13 Wives had no legal identity under co-
verture; their husbands represented them in all legal matters.14 
                                                 
9. Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Context: Women and Rights Discourse in Nine-
teenth-Century America (Baltimore, 2007), 13–14, 67; Hartog, Man and Wife, 115.  
10. Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, 
MA, 2000), 3–8. 
11. Ibid., 13–21; Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women 
and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York, 1999), 11–15; Joan Williams, Un-
bending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It (New 
York, 2001), 20–22. 
12. Hartog, Man and Wife, 298–99. 
13. In 1921, in Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., the North Carolina Supreme 
Court found that a wife could recover damages following the negligent injury 
of her husband. Four years later, however, the court reversed itself in Hinnant 
v. Tide Water Power Company. See discussion of these cases below. 
14. Courts generally did not consider wives separate from their husbands, but 
this rule was not absolute.  For example, “if [a wife] committed crimes on her 
own against others, even if ‘by the bare command of her husband,’ she was 
theoretically punishable as if single because her duty to obey the law was ‘of a 
higher nature’ than her duty to obey her husband.” Hartog, Man and Wife, 108. 
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The lack of a legal identity meant that a married woman could 
not bring her own suit; her husband had to join that suit, and he 
would receive compensation for any damages assessed. In addi-
tion, a husband had a right to his wife’s services, but case law did 
not establish a wife’s right to her husband’s services. For these 
reasons, a wife could not make a claim for loss of consortium.15     
 Beginning in the 1830s and continuing through the 1870s, 
state legislatures passed married women’s property acts, which 
established a wife’s separate ownership of the property she 
brought to the marriage and some of her earnings. These acts 
also established a wife’s right to sue without her husband join-
ing the suit.16 Legislatures were primarily interested in shielding 
a wife’s premarital assets from her husband’s creditors.17 Married 
women’s property acts legally released wives from the patriar-
chal legal authority of their husbands, provided some economic 
autonomy, and changed wives’ relationship with the state. 
Nonetheless, judges tended to limit the scope of the statutes; 
scholars generally agree that the married women’s property 
acts did not result in radical changes for women.18  
 During the first half of the twentieth century, the dominant 
cultural conception of marriage changed from a patriarchal in-
stitution that prioritized economic security and reproduction to 
a democratic union grounded in romantic love, mutual sexual 
desire, and emotional fulfillment. Scholars attribute this change 
in the perception of marriage to several cultural developments. 
The Victorian idea that middle-class and upper-class white 
women were passionless gave way to acceptance that sexual de-
sire was natural “among so-called respectable women.” The 
birth control movement offered many married women access 
to more reliable contraception. The Nineteenth Amendment, 
passed in 1920, granted women the right to vote, thus acknowl-
edging wives’ separate identity and citizenship. These changes 
                                                 
15. Ibid., 115–16, 299; Holbrook, “Change in the Meaning of Consortium,” 2. 
16. Holbrook, “Change in the Meaning of Consortium,” 4. 
17. Cott, Public Vows, 52–55; Sullivan, Constitutional Context, 9, 14; Richard Chu-
sed, “Married Women’s Property Law, 1800–1850,” Georgetown Law Journal 71 
(1982–1983), 1398–1403. 
18. Carole Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 
Journal of Women’s History 6 (1994), 9–16. 
206      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
meant that wives had the opportunity to express themselves 
more fully, but they still experienced inequality.19
 At the same time, the number of women working outside 
the home increased dramatically as a result of the economic dis-
tress of the Great Depression and the labor shortages of World 
War II. With the exception of the decade between 1910 and 1920, 
the number of women in Iowa’s labor force increased in every 
decade from 1900 to 1950. The greatest increase was between 
1940 and 1944, when the number of working women increased 
by 56 percent. In the Acuffs’ hometown of Waterloo, the 17 fac-
tories that produced war materials employed 14,000 workers, 
4,000 of whom were women.20  
 Even as women were increasingly represented in the work 
force, the paradigm of husband as provider and wife as depen-
dent was entrenched in New Deal public policy. This standard 
influenced how private and public sector employers viewed 
and compensated their female employees.21 The assumption 
that a wife’s primary responsibilities within a marriage were 
domestic labor and childcare did not change.22
 The end of the war renewed the emphasis on a wife’s do-
mestic responsibilities. Returning soldiers were anxious to es-
tablish themselves as wage earners and heads of households. 
Many wives who had been employed returned to full-time 
housewifery either voluntarily or under duress. Following 
decades of economic and wartime disruption, men and women 
looked forward to establishing homes that served as comfort-
able and safe family retreats.23 Historian Elaine Tyler May ar-
                                                 
19. Rebecca L. Davis, “ ‘Not Marriage at All, but Simple Harlotry’: The Com-
panionate Marriage Controversy,” Journal of American History 94 (2008), 1137–
41; Cott, Public Vows, 157–60; Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American 
Families in the Cold War Era (New York, 1988), 40–52. 
20. May, Homeward Bound, 40–52; Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa: The Middle Land 
(Ames, 1996), 281–84. 
21. Cott, Public Vows, 157–58, 176–78. Blanche Crozier identified this shift in 
“Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex,” Boston University Legal 
Review 15 (1935), 748–49. 
22. May, Homeward Bound, 59–60. 
23. Ibid., 39–90. The shift in attitudes about women’s employment is reflected 
in the meeting programs of the Iowa League of Women Voters. From 1936 
through 1940 the league’s annual list of priorities included statements about 
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gues that for people who had grown up during the Great De-
pression, the comfort of traditional gender roles was an antidote 
to the disruption that had characterized their childhood and 
early adult years.24  
 Employer practices also discouraged wives from working. 
Employers defined the ideal worker as one who worked full-
time and overtime without time off for childbearing or child-
rearing. Wives and mothers who needed or chose to work out-
side the home could not meet such expectations and often 
found only marginal employment.25  
 Consistent with society’s changing view of marriage, judges 
in the twentieth century generally preferred to view marriage 
as a bond freely entered into and based on love rather than as a 
contract formed in order to exchange economic support for ser-
vices. When judges began avoiding the “direct language of ser-
vice,” consortium became a “protean term that suggested the 
complex yet irreducible qualities of a loving marriage.”26 Under 
this theory, loss of consortium included loss of “love, affection, 
companionship, [and] sexual relations.”27 As the definition of 
loss of consortium changed, the claim’s scope, legal significance, 
and continued existence became uncertain.   
 Attorney Frederick White recognized an opportunity to ex-
pand the claim. He understood the need to develop a distinctive 
argument that would appeal to the judges who would decide 
the case; wives had brought loss of consortium claims in many 
states and lost. White knew that judges were situated in a cul-
                                                                                                       
expanding employment opportunities: “opposition to all discrimination in 
public employment based on sex or marital status” (1936, 1937, 1939) or “re-
moving remaining legal and administrative discrimination which prevents 
women from having an effective equality with men” (1938). But throughout 
the late 1940s and 1950s, employment equality disappeared from the league’s 
list of priorities. “Program Record, League of Women Voters 1922–1957,” 
folder: League Publications, 1968–72, box 87, Iowa League of Women Voters 
Collection, Iowa Women’s Archives (IWA), University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa 
City; Patty Johnson, Women’s Editor, “Annual Edition, Waterloo, City of the 
Future,” Waterloo Courier, 12/26/1952, folder 2: Waterloo, 1941–65, box 29, 
Iowa League of Women Voters Collection, IWA. 
24. May, Homeward Bound, 52–53. 
25. Williams, Unbending Gender, 1–6. 
26. Hartog, Man and Wife, 299. 
27. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950).  
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ture that understood marriage as a lifelong bond that defined 
distinct roles for husbands and wives. Many judges focused on 
the wife’s role as a dependent. White decided to argue that a 
wife’s dependence was a reason to allow the claim rather than a 
reason to deny it. He hoped that the judges would view the case 
as an opportunity to celebrate and affirm marriage as a partner-
ship. In the 1950s, marriage was the central relationship in most 
people’s lives. People valued marriage for companionship, love, 
and family. The Acuffs shared these values. White hoped to ex-
ploit contemporary cultural values surrounding marriage to 
support his argument that both husbands and wives should be 
entitled to make the same legal claims; the law should treat both 
parties in a marriage similarly. 
 
WHEN Maude McKee and Glen Acuff married on June 28, 1940, 
they did not question the traditional gendered roles of husband 
and wife. In 1954 Glen’s injury forced them to alter their marital 
roles. They viewed these changes in their family as an unfortu-
nate exception to the traditional roles of husband and wife. 
When they agreed that Maude would become a plaintiff in 
Acuff v. Schmit, their hope was that the courts would recognize 
the irreparable damage to their marriage. They did not think of 
their claim as an effort to advance gender equality.28
 As children, Maude and Glen had experienced Depression-
era deprivation. Born February 25, 1922, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 
Maude was the oldest of seven children of William and Rose 
McKee.29 When Maude was a child, the McKees purchased an 
acreage on the edge of Waterloo. In 1931 Rose contracted tuber-
culosis and was confined for several months to the Oakdale 
Sanatorium.30 During her absence, William juggled caring for 
his children with working the third shift at John Deere Manu-
facturing. On the day Rose returned home, her exhausted hus-
band was hospitalized with pneumonia. He died two days later. 
                                                 
28. Acuffs interview. 
29. “Obituaries—Maude L. Acuff 1922–2010,” WCF Courier.com, 8/22/2010, 
http://wcfcourier.com/lifestyles/announcements/obituaries/maude-l-acuff/ 
article_5fb558ae-ac9c-11df-b9cf-001cc4c002e0.html. 
30. Kate Caughron (Maude Acuff’s sister), interview by Joy Smith, Waterloo, 
10/24/2011. 
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Maude was ten years old. Unable to make mortgage payments, 
the family lost their home and moved to a series of rental homes 
in northeast Waterloo. When Maude was 15, she quit high school 
and began cleaning houses in order to supplement the family’s 
income.31
 One year before her father’s death, Maude was attending a 
Salvation Army worship service with her friend when two un-
familiar boys walked into the church. She remembered joking to 
her friend, “Oh my gosh, there’s some new guys coming in. I’ll 
tell you what. I’ll marry the taller one and you marry the other 
one.” The “taller one” was Glen Robert Acuff. Two years older 
than Maude, Glen had been born September 14, 1920, on a farm 
near Sumner, Iowa, to Lloyd William and Drucie Bower Acuff. 
At some point, Lloyd left his family. Drucie raised Glen and his 
two brothers on the farm, eventually remarrying.32
 On June 28, 1940, Maude did marry Glen. Their oldest son 
was born the following year. Not long after, Glen enlisted in the 
U.S. Navy. Following the war, the Acuffs had three children in 
quick succession and moved to an acreage southwest of Water-
loo. Glen worked for a time at John Deere Tractor Works and at 
Chamberlain Manufacturing before taking the construction job 
he held at the time of the accident.33
 For young men like Glen who returned from the war anx-
ious to put down roots and start a family, Waterloo offered 
numerous opportunities for employment at a decent wage. 
Located in northeast Iowa and the county seat of Black Hawk 
County, Waterloo in 1950 was a vibrant community of 65,000 
with an economy based in heavy industry. The city experienced 
a 26 percent population increase between 1940 and 1950. In 1954 
there were 134 manufacturing concerns in the city. The two larg-
est, Rath Packing and John Deere Tractor Works, each employed 
more than 7,000 workers. 34  
                                                 
31. Caughron interview; Acuffs interview. 
32. Acuffs interview; Waterloo–Cedar Falls Courier, 4/29/1996; Caughron interview. 
33. Acuffs interview. 
34. 1950 Census of Population: Volume 2, Characteristics of Population: Part 15, 
Iowa (Washington DC, 1952), 15–18; Waterloo Iowa Centennial 1854–1954: 
Prairidrama, Souvenir Program, 33; Glenda Riley, Cities on the Cedar: A Portrait of 
Cedar Falls, Waterloo, and Black Hawk County (Parkersburg, IA, 1988), 59–73.  
210      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
 Like many women of her era, Maude took on and probably 
looked forward to the roles of housewife and mother. Glen was 
the breadwinner and head of the household. Maude was respon-
sible for the work of the family: housekeeping, caring for their 
children, and creating a welcoming, stable home environment.35  
 The Salvation Army was the center of Maude and Glen’s 
social and religious life. When Maude was a little girl, shortly 
after the family moved to Waterloo, neighbors invited her par-
ents to join “The Army.” When William died, the church of-
fered spiritual and financial sustenance to Rose. Glen’s first 
experience in the church came at the invitation of a boyhood 
friend. As a young married couple, Glen and Maude assumed 
leadership responsibilities in the church: Glen was a favorite 
Sunday school teacher of older teens and adults; and Maude led 
the Girl Guards, served as the Sunday school secretary, sang in 
the Songster Brigade, and sold copies of War Cry, the church 
magazine. Before the accident, Glen and Maude had planned to 
train as officers, the church’s form of ministry.36 Many Ameri-
cans think of the Salvation Army as a Christian social service 
agency, but historian Lillian Taiz notes that urban working-
class families were drawn to the locally controlled nondenomi-
national missions because they offered opportunities for use-
fulness and leadership and a sense of community.37
 On the day of his accident, Glen was on his way home from 
work to clean up before returning to Waterloo to attend a dinner 
at the church with his family. News of the accident spread 
quickly through the church community. Members immediately 
came to the Acuffs’ aid, providing Maude with childcare, trans–
                                                 
35. Acuffs interview. 
36. Maude and Glen’s youngest daughter and her husband later became offi-
cers, and many members of the extended family remain active with the Salva-
tion Army. Information about Acuff family involvement with the Salvation 
Army is from Fred Acuff, e-mail to author, 3/30/2009.   
37. While dominated by the working class, the Salvation Army always attracted 
some educated middle-class members. Beginning in the 1930s, these members 
began to push for a centralized hierarchical church structure, modulation of 
religious expression, and a social work paradigm. Although the middle-class 
agenda ultimately prevailed, Salvation Army members continued to reject con-
sumerism and materialism. Lillian Taiz, Hallelujah Lads and Lasses: Remaking 
the Salvation Army in America, 1880–1930 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 1–10, 167. 
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The Acuff family before Glen’s accident, summer 1951. From left to right, 
Fred, Glen, Kenny, Judy, Maude, and Billy. Photo courtesy Fred Acuff. 
sportation, and lodging near the Iowa City Veterans Hospital, 
where Glen was hospitalized. In the difficult months and years 
that followed, the family received material assistance and 
gained spiritual strength from the Salvation Army.38
 Paralyzed as a result of his spinal cord injury, Glen was dis-
charged from the hospital after five months. Maude and her 
sons assumed responsibility for all of Glen’s personal care and 
mobility needs. They learned to transfer Glen from bed to chair 
to car. Glen painfully “pounded” and exercised his arms and 
hands daily to recover some function of his upper extremities. 
Slowly, he learned to live with his disabilities, but he could no 
longer support his family financially. For the first year or two, 
the family survived on the meager public assistance allowance, 
supplemented by help from family and church.39  
                                                 
38. Acuffs interview; Caughron interview. 
39. Acuffs interview. Fred Acuff remembers that the family received govern-
ment food commodities but that there were times when there was no food in 
the house. He recalls that the family received $165 per month in assistance. 
Acuffs interview. This amount is consistent with aid payments at the time. In 
1943 the Iowa legislature passed the Aid to Dependent Children Act, which 
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 Maude realized that something had to change. In the early 
winter of 1955 she suggested to Glen that she get a job. She 
wanted to answer a newspaper ad for seasonal help wrapping 
specialty gifts for Santa Claus Industries. At first Glen resisted, 
insisting that it was his place to support the family. Maude gen-
tly persisted, convincing Glen that with her earnings from this 
temporary job they would be able to “give the kids a Christmas.” 
The company liked Maude’s work, and the temporary job be-
came permanent.40
 In the summer of 1955, a few months before Maude was 
hired at Santa Claus Industries, Frederick White approached 
the Acuffs regarding the possibility of filing the loss of consor-
tium claim on Maude’s behalf. The couple needed any financial 
award a suit might bring. They also sought recognition of the 
damage their family had suffered. They trusted White and de-
cided to bring the suit.41  
 
BORN IN 1928, White was the first in his family to study law. 
His father was the general foreman of shipping at Rath Packing 
Company in Waterloo. The senior Mr. White had taken a job as 
a laborer at Rath after his father had lost the family farm in the 
recession of 1919–1920. White’s mother eventually worked as a 
saleswoman, but when White was young she worked as a house-
wife and cared for White and his two brothers. Like many young 
men of his generation, White joined the military upon high 
school graduation; in December 1944 he enlisted in the Army 
Air Corps, where he trained as a cryptographer. Following the 
                                                                                                       
was designed to provide assistance to needy children under the age of 18 who 
were regularly attending school, living with a family member, and who were 
deprived of parental support and care due to the death, continued absence 
from home, or physical or mental incapacity of either parent. The 56th General 
Assembly (1955–56) passed an amendment that limited assistance to any family 
to $175 per month. The constitutionality of this amendment was successfully 
challenged in 1957. In a decision written by Chief Justice Norman Hays, who 
also wrote the decision in Acuff, the court ruled that the amendment unfairly 
discriminated among dependent children because the original law granted 
assistance to individual children, and the amendment varied the amount of 
assistance received by each child based on the number of children in their fam-
ily. Collins v. State Bd. of Soc. Welfare, 81 N.W.2d 4, 6–9 (Iowa 1957).  
40. Acuffs interview. 
41. Ibid. 
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war, he returned to his hometown and a job at Rath skinning 
calves and boning lamb and veal. He soon took advantage of 
the GI Bill to enroll at Iowa State Teachers College in neighbor-
ing Cedar Falls. A year-and-a-half into his studies, encouraged 
by one of his professors, White transferred to the University 
of Chicago and enrolled in a four-year program that offered a 
combined law and liberal arts degree. He earned a J.D. degree 
in 1951.42
 The curriculum at the University of Chicago Law School 
was unusual. When the Law School was founded in 1902, Uni-
versity President William Rainey Harper advocated for the 
“wholeness of the institution,” emphasizing the importance of 
closely connecting the law school with the liberal arts depart-
ments, including history, sociology, and political science. Har-
per’s insistence on an integrative approach led to lively debate 
among faculty, some arguing that reducing the time for study-
ing pure law, even for third-year students, was unthinkable.43 
Although the combined degree was discontinued during 
White’s years in the program, aspects of the cross-disciplinary 
curriculum survived. White recalls that professors from history, 
economics, and other social sciences regularly delivered lectures 
in his law classes.44  
 White’s Chicago training prepared him for the trial and ap-
pellate work that dominated his career during the 50 years he 
practiced general law in northeast Iowa. The integrated course-
work taught him to reason historically about the law. His ex-
                                                 
42. White interview. 
43. Frank Ellsworth, Law on the Midway: The Founding of the University of Chi-
cago Law School (Chicago, 1977), 50–69. Law school curricula typically followed 
a model of professional education established in the late nineteenth century by 
Professor C. C. Langdell at Harvard University. Langdell advanced the idea of 
an academic meritocracy requiring a bachelor’s degree for admission, estab-
lishing a sequential three-year curriculum, and using the case method of peda-
gogy. “The Harvard position was the traditional one taken by the few law 
schools which had considered the issue. Subjects related to the liberal arts did 
not belong in legal education, and those deemed slightly questionable were 
assigned to seminars.” Ellsworth, Law on the Midway, 69. For an extensive dis-
cussion of Langdell’s influence on professional pedagogy, see Bruce A. Kim-
ball, The Inception of Modern Professional Education: C. C. Langdell (Chapel Hill, 
NC, 2009). 
44. White interview. 
214      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
 
Attorney Frederick White circa 1960. Photo courtesy 
Frederick White. 
perience on the school’s nationally competitive debate and 
moot court teams trained him to shape a persuasive argument. 
Certainly his intellect was honed by interaction with capable 
and motivated classmates, several of whom would develop na-
tional reputations in politics and law: his classmates included 
Ramsey Clark, who would serve as U.S. attorney general dur-
ing the Johnson administration; future members of Congress 
Abner Mikva and Patsy Mink; and failed U.S. Supreme Court 
nominee and Yale law professor Robert Bork.45
 Although White thrived in the challenging academic arena 
at the University of Chicago, he did not lose touch with his 
working-class roots. Unable to locate a job as a lawyer following 
graduation, he returned to the factory floor at Rath for a brief 
                                                 
45. Ibid. 
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time. He then sold insurance for a few months before deciding 
that if he was ever going to practice law he should start. In March 
1952 he rented office space in his hometown, borrowed his 
mother’s old dining room chairs, acquired a portable typewriter, 
and opened his law practice. In the summer of 1953 he married; 
by the spring of 1955, when he read Hitaffer and began consider-
ing filing a loss of consortium case on behalf of Maude Acuff, he 
was a young parent, probably sensitive to how the loss of a male 
breadwinner could seriously jeopardize a family’s security.46
 White filed Acuff v. Schmit in Black Hawk County District 
Court on July 9, 1955, before Judge George Heath. Based on 
decades of precedent that had denied a wife the right to claim 
loss of consortium, defense attorneys Glenn Beers and R. Bruce 
Hughes argued for dismissal.47 Judge Heath, according to White, 
could not understand his argument. White remembers Heath 
as a good judge and a conservative man whose thinking about 
a wife’s right to the loss of consortium claim was entrenched in 
the reasoning that had prevailed in earlier decisions.48 Judge 
Heath dismissed the case.49 White was not deterred. He be-
lieved in his argument and felt that there was nothing to lose 
on appeal. On October 20, 1955, he filed a note of appeal to the 
Iowa Supreme Court. He began the arduous task of researching 
the convoluted history of coverture and loss of consortium in 
case law and carefully drafting his brief.50
 
COURTS defined the claim for loss of consortium in various 
ways after its emergence in nineteenth-century case law. White 
spent several months tracing those developments. The married 
                                                 
46. Ibid. 
47. Petition at Law, Motion to Dismiss, Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272 (Iowa 
1956) (No. 10-48939), 7–8. Glenn Beers, the senior defense attorney, is deceased. 
R. Bruce Hughes, who prepared the appellee’s brief, later moved to San Fran-
cisco. White interview. 
48. White interview; Frederick G. White, telephone interview with Hoey, 11/11/ 
2011.  
49. Petition at Law, Ruling on Motion, Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272 (Iowa 1956) 
(No. 10-48939), 9. 
50. Petition at Law, Notice of Appeal, Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272 (Iowa 1956) 
(No. 10-48939), 9. At the time, White was also employed as an assistant county 
attorney. White interview. 
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women’s property acts enacted in the mid-nineteenth century 
granted wives the right to bring independent legal claims, but 
judges had a variety of concerns that caused them to limit the 
scope of those acts. Judges concluded that wives could bring 
loss of consortium suits when a defendant intentionally inter-
fered with the marital relationship, as in alienation of affection 
cases, but they consistently refused to find that the married 
women’s property acts entitled a wife to a claim for loss of con-
sortium following a negligent injury to her husband.51  
 The possibility of double recovery in loss of consortium 
cases based on negligence concerned many judges.52 They be-
lieved that differences between the roles of husbands and wives 
required different treatment. They reasoned that double recovery 
could occur in one scenario but not in a second. In the first sce-
nario, a husband is injured and both husband and wife sue. The 
wife receives compensation for her loss of consortium. The hus-
band receives compensation for his injuries and for the loss of 
his ability to support his wife. In the second scenario, a wife is 
injured and both husband and wife sue. The husband receives 
compensation for his loss of consortium. The wife receives com-
pensation for her injuries. However, the wife does not receive 
compensation for any lost ability to support her husband be-
cause she has no obligation to support him. Double recovery 
occurs in the first scenario because the wife recovers for the 
same loss twice; she receives a loss of consortium award, and 
she also benefits from her husband’s award for the lost ability 
to support her. Double recovery does not occur in the second 
scenario. Double recovery also could not occur in cases where 
the loss of consortium claim was based on intentional inter-
ference with the marriage because in those cases the husband 
“was a joint wrongdoer with the defendant” and therefore 
could have no cause of action against the defendant. Based on 
these concerns, which were still grounded in the legal status of 
the wife as a dependent under coverture, judges rejected loss of 
                                                 
51. White interview; Hartog, Man and Wife, 298–99; Cott, Private Vows, 52–55, 
168–69; Holbrook, “Change in the Meaning of Consortium,” 4–6; Sullivan, 
Constitutional Context, 69; Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 816 n.30 (listing cases). 
52. Leon Green et al., Cases on Injuries to Relations (St. Paul, 1968), 245. 
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consortium claims brought by wives whose husbands had been 
negligently injured.53  
 Courts rejected a wife’s loss of consortium claim based on 
negligence for other reasons as well. For example, some courts 
said the claim of loss of consortium was based in loss of services, 
and because the wife had no claim to her husband’s services she 
could not recover.54 Other courts denied wives the claim, finding 
that wives did not have property rights.55 Courts also argued 
that the wife’s injury was too indirect or remote to measure and 
expressed concern that children and other people might be able 
to recover for loss of consortium if the claim was extended to 
wives.56 Because wives and children were both dependents un-
der the law, some judges likely believed that such an expansion 
of the claim was a strong possibility.57  
 Believing that they could not create what they considered 
a new cause of action without relying on a statute or other au-
thority, courts indicated that legislatures could create a cause 
of action for wives if they considered it necessary.58 Even though 
courts stated that they recognized the unfairness of allowing a 
husband a cause of action while denying a wife the same cause 
of action, they claimed that they were not in a role to resolve 
problems of gender inequality and other social issues.59 In at-
                                                 
53. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814; Evans Holbrook, “Change in the Meaning of Con-
sortium,” 6. 
54. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813 (citing cases, including Stout v. Kansas City Terminal 
Ry. Co., 157 S.W. 1019, 1022 [Mo. App. 1913]). In 1963 the Missouri Supreme 
Court decided that Stout should not be followed. See Novak v. Kansas City Tran-
sit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Mo. 1963). 
55. Ibid., 815 (citing cases, including Stout, 157 S.W. at 1021). 
56. “Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium,” Columbia Law 
Review 61 (1961), 1350, 1355; Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 815.  
57. Hartog, Man and Wife, 193. 
58. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814 (citing cases, including Stout, 147 S.W. at 1021, 
where the court noted that “the entire damage in cases of negligent injury to 
a husband or father has always been considered as centering in him . . . and a 
settlement with him has always been recognized as closing the incident”); 
“Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium,” 1350, 1352.  
59. See Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1952): “We have given careful 
consideration to the able arguments advanced in the Hitaffer case, many of 
which are founded on sound reasoning and which logically support the con-
clusion reached if considered as an argument of what the law should be. They 
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tempting to avoid the issues, they allowed unjust principles to 
remain embedded in the law. 
 Courts sometimes found arguments about equal treatment 
persuasive and decided that neither the husband nor the wife 
could recover for loss of consortium.60 Nearly 30 years before 
Hitaffer, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a series of 
rulings on loss of consortium that highlighted equal-treatment 
arguments. In 1921 the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected 
arguments regarding concerns over expanding liability and 
found that a wife could recover for loss of consortium.61 That 
decision was the first to allow a wife to recover for loss of con-
sortium based on negligence.62 The court overruled that decision 
in 1925, finding that the wife’s “mental anguish” alone could not 
entitle her to compensation.63 In 1945 the court decided that nei-
ther the wife nor the husband could recover for loss of consor-
tium, reasoning that this result treated the parties equally.64  
 Concern about compensation for emotional harm likely in-
fluenced some judges considering loss of consortium cases. The 
husband’s action for loss of consortium grew out of his entitle-
ment to his wife’s services. Because a wife could not point to 
                                                                                                       
might well appeal to the Legislature. But we find them wholly unconvincing 
when viewed from the only angle from which our jurisdiction permits us to 
consider them, namely, a determination of what the law of Florida is.” The 
Florida Supreme Court changed course in 1971, finding that a wife had a de-
rivative right to loss of consortium and stating that the “the recent changes in 
the legal and societal status of women in our society forces us to recognize a 
change in the doctrine with which this opinion is concerned.” See Gates v. Foley, 
247 So.2d 40, 44-45 (Fla. 1971). 
60. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813 n.11 (citing cases, including Marri v. Stamford St. R. 
Co., 78 A. 582, 587 [Conn. 1911], where the court said it was “of the opinion 
that the reason for the former rule no longer exists, and that it should cease to 
have recognition.” The Connecticut Supreme Court overruled Marri in 1979. 
See Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 408 A.2d 260 (Conn. 1979). 
61. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813; Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 108 S.E. 318, 
323 (N.C. 1921), overruled by Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 126 S.E. 307, 312 
(N.C. 1925).  
62. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813. 
63. Ibid.; Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 126 S.E. 307, 312 (N.C. 1925), over-
ruled by Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 32 S.E.2d 611, 612–14 (N.C. 1945). 
64. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 32 S.E.2d 611, 612–14 (N.C. 1945), overruled 
by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 266 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980); 
Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813 n.7. 
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any similar entitlement, her claim could be framed as one for 
purely emotional distress, as it was by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in 1925. Some court decisions likely reflected dis-
comfort with compensating emotional harm. In fact, debate 
over whether and how to compensate for emotional harm con-
tinues today. In the 1950s disruptions in marital relationships 
likely affected wives more than husbands; wives were often 
separated from their extended families and lacked the social 
connections husbands built through work.65    
 With the exception of the briefly held 1921 decision of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, no court found a wife entitled 
to loss of consortium based on negligence until 1950, when the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court decided Hitaffer v. Argonne 
Co. Inc., the case that captured White’s attention as he comforted 
his infant daughter on the spring morning in 1955.66 The Hitaffer 
court noted that an action for loss of consortium was not based 
primarily in loss of services but in loss of a relationship. The 
court stated that many reasons for denying recovery were illogi-
cal because they applied equally in suits where the husband sued. 
According to the court, “simple mathematics” could solve any 
potential problem with double recovery. A court could subtract 
from the wife’s award the amount the husband had recovered 
for his obligation to support his wife. The Hitaffer court believed 
that judges who denied recovery relied on “medieval concepts 
of the marriage relation.”67  
 The Hitaffer court saw itself as describing a new understand-
ing of marriage.  
It can hardly be said that a wife has less of an interest in the mar-
riage relation than does the husband or in these modern times that 
a husband renders services of such a different character to the 
family and household that they must be measured by a standard 
                                                 
65. Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, in The Measure of Injury (New 
York, 2010), 2–3, identify “the recent trend toward eliminating or curtailing 
noneconomic damages.” They argue that “the marginalizing of emotional 
harm and noneconomic injury has worked to the systematic disadvantage of 
women and minority plaintiffs, who may find that the most serious recurring 
injuries in their lives are not compensable in tort.” See below for a discussion 
of wives and their extended family ties. 
66. Minzer et al., eds., Damages in Tort Actions, 2:11.02[2][b]. 
67. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814–15, 819. 
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of such uncertainty that the law cannot estimate any loss thereof. 
The husband owes the same degree of love, affection, felicity, etc., 
to the wife as she to him. He also owes the material service of 
support, but above and beyond that he renders other services as 
his mate’s helper in her duties, as advisor and counselor, etc. 
Marriage was a partnership, according to the court, in which 
each partner contributed equally valuable services. The hus-
band’s contribution to the relationship was not purely financial 
but also involved emotional support and friendship.68
 The Hitaffer decision reflected the understanding of marriage 
in the 1950s and the celebration of marriage as the primary emo-
tional relationship in people’s lives. So many people married in 
the 1940s and 1950s that “forging an independent life outside 
marriage carried enormous risks of emotional and economic 
hardship, along with social ostracism.”69 In addition, as Nancy 
Cott notes, in the 1940s marriage was “seen as more companion-
ate, more flexibly defined, [and] less hierarchically structured 
than in the past.”70 Because the Hitaffer court saw marriage as 
a partnership based on love, denying wives the loss of consor-
tium claim was denying its vision of marriage as partnership.  
 Despite its focus on marriage as a partnership, the Hitaffer 
court did not directly challenge the inequalities present in the 
prevailing structure of marriage. Instead, it emphasized each 
partner’s valuable contributions to the relationship. Each partner 
had distinct roles, but the roles for each were significant and 
worthy of public support and recognition. The Hitaffer court 
did not question these separate roles. In its view, allowing a 
wife to bring a loss of consortium claim publicly recognized the 
love and affection present in marriage and strengthened the emo-
tional commitment between husband and wife. It affirmed, 
rather than challenged, traditional marital roles. When Freder-
ick White appealed Judge Heath’s decision to the Iowa Supreme 
Court, he was able to look to Hitaffer as a model for structuring 
his arguments in a way that would appeal to the cultural values 
of the Iowa Supreme Court justices. 
                                                 
68. Ibid., 819. 
69. May, Homeward Bound, 3–5, 38. 
70. Cott, Public Vows, 181. 
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THE NINE Iowa Supreme Court justices who decided Acuff in 
1956 reflected the majority of the citizenry that elected them.71 
All men, the justices ranged in age from 50 to 86, all but one 
born in the nineteenth century. All were Republicans; all were 
married with children; six of the nine identified as Protestant. 
All but one graduated from an Iowa law school. The exception, 
Norman R. Hays, who wrote for the majority in Acuff v. Schmit, 
graduated from Harvard Law School. The judges’ average 
length of service on the court at the time they decided Acuff v. 
Schmit was 9.6 years.72
 Although active political party involvement was a prerequi-
site for election to the bench, evidence suggests that most judges 
                                                 
71. Except for a period between 1913 and 1918 when judges were elected on a 
nonpartisan basis, Iowa judges were elected in partisan general elections. That 
changed in 1962, when Iowa voters ratified a constitutional amendment that 
established gubernatorial appointment of district and supreme court justices 
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professional competence of justices and raise the selection process above parti-
san politics. The Judicial Department, Iowa’s Third Branch (Des Moines, 1984), 2–3. 
The effectiveness of the reform in keeping partisan politics out of judicial 
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“Iowans Dismiss Three Justices,” Des Moines Register, 11/3/2010; A. G. Sulz-
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11/3/2010; Jeff Eckhoff, “Voters Retain Justice Wiggins,” Des Moines Register, 
11/12/2012. 
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Lawrence, Henry Kaare Peterson, G. K. Thompson, and Charles F. Wen-
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tices); Justice Robert L. Larson to President Millard G. Roberts, Parsons Col-
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were motivated by a sense of public service and a commitment 
to the rule of law rather than by political power. Chief Justice 
Norman R. Hays came from a family of lawyers and was a 
county attorney and a district judge before his appointment 
to the Iowa Supreme Court in 1946. A grandson who was raised 
by Judge Hays remembers him as passionate about politics and 
a “news junkie,” a sociable but reserved man who was respect-
ful of others and never raised his voice at his wife.73 Before his 
appointment to the state’s highest court, Justice Robert L. Lar-
son had served as attorney for Iowa City and Johnson County 
and as state attorney general. He spoke widely to civic groups 
on a range of topics related to citizenship and the rule of law. In 
a letter to the president of Parsons College, his undergraduate 
alma mater, he summed up his public service. “My main inter-
est is the welfare of my fellowmen, and [I] have concentrated 
my efforts to get everyone to respect and obey the laws of our 
state and nation, as well as God’s superior laws; to respect one 
another’s rights as individuals as well as fellow-citizens and to 
help others help themselves.”74
 Salaries were modest, and the justices received minimal 
compensation for expenses. Attorney White recalled that some 
justices slept in the back of the courtroom when the court was 
in session.75 In 1960 Judge Larson described this arrangement. 
It’s a rather antique setup . . . and it has been there . . . ever since 
the State house was built. Originally the judges and their wives 
stayed in those cubbyholes [small rooms behind the conference 
rooms which were adjacent to the courtroom] and they cooked 
and lived there regularly. Of course as the court grew from three 
to five, and then to seven, such quarters were not adequate. Now 
the rooms behind the conference rooms have become offices and 
sleeping quarters, with cots, desks and books. When I joined the 
                                                 
73. Knoxville Journal, 9/9/1946; Lorin Nelson “Larry” Hays IV, e-mail to Joy 
Smith, 6/2/2011. Judge Hays’s father, Lorin Nelson Hays, and his uncle, E. R. 
Hays, moved to Knoxville, Iowa, from Fostoria, Ohio, in the decade following 
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74. Robert L. Larson to Millard G. Roberts, 12/12/1955, file: Correspondence 
1950–62, box 2, Larson Collection. 
75. White interview. 
Acuff v. Schmit      223 
court, all but about one or two members of the court slept there. 
Now only four do so. The rest of us live in hotels while we are in 
session at Des Moines.76  
Justice Hays’s grandson recalled that when the court was in 
session his grandmother would drive his grandfather to Des 
Moines, where he would live for the week in the old Kirkwood 
Hotel. “Others always assumed that a Supreme Court Justice 
made a lot of money, but they didn’t. [Grandpa] retired without 
much in the way of benefits and left only a small estate.”77
 Although the court gradually made procedural changes 
in response to the demands of a growing docket of cases, the 
court’s routine grew out of decades of tradition. The court con-
vened in the State Capitol in Des Moines for one week of each 
month except July and August. Monday was reserved for judi-
cial conference. On the remaining days of the week the justices 
typically heard six cases each day. The mantle of chief justice 
rotated among the judges, with each judge serving a six-month 
term.78 Responsibility for writing opinions was also assigned on 
a rotating basis. Each day closed with an informal conference 
when the judges shared preliminary views. At the end of a 
week-long session the judges returned to their hometowns for 
the remainder of the month to research and write opinions. 
Once drafted, mimeographed copies of opinions were circu-
lated by mail. Formal concurrences were sent to the author of 
an opinion. If a judge did not concur with an opinion, he wrote 
and circulated a dissenting opinion. At the Monday conference 
the following month the judges formally voted on each decision, 
indicating concurrence or dissent. If there were conflicting 
views, a case might be held over to allow time for both sides to 
                                                 
76. Robert L. Larson, “Speech to Appellate Practice Class,” 4/19/1960, folder: 
Speeches, box 2, Larson Collection. 
77. Hays, e-mail to Smith. 
78. In 1960 the Iowa legislature directed a shift to a permanent chief justice 
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present their views and modify their opinions to gain more 
support.79
 The court did not require oral arguments, but an attorney’s 
ability to craft and present an argument could significantly in-
fluence the court’s opinion. The justice assigned to write the 
opinion read the case briefs the night before the hearing. One 
or two other justices might read the briefs in advance, but most 
had little familiarity with a case before it was heard. The appel-
lant was allowed 30 minutes to present the case and 15 minutes 
on reply. The ability to briefly state the facts of the case, clearly 
articulate the questions of law, and persuasively and concisely 
present an argument was important. In a speech to a group of 
law students, Judge Larson emphasized the importance of oral 
argument. 
You have the nine member court passing on your case—not just 
one or two judges especially interested in your problem. If you 
should do a poor job of arguing orally or, by repetition, put the 
members to sleep, they probably won’t know enough about your 
case when it is written to take issue with the judge who wrote the 
opinion, and it may go through without close scrutiny of several 
members of the court.80
Frederick White’s University of Chicago moot court experience 
had taught him the importance of a carefully honed oral argu-
ment. He was prepared to capture the judges’ attention.81
 
RESPONSIVENESS to questions of equality and civil rights is 
a hallmark of the Iowa Supreme Court. In the first case to come 
before the Iowa Territorial Court, In Re the matter of Ralph 1839, 
the court determined that Ralph, a slave working in the lead 
mines near Dubuque under a written agreement with his Mis-
souri owner, could not be forced to return to slavery in Missouri 
when he failed to purchase his freedom. The ruling stated that 
“‘no man in this territory can be reduced to slavery.’” In Clark 
v. The Board of Directors, decided in 1868, the court found that 
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80. Ibid. 
81. White interview. 
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segregated schools were fundamentally unequal. The ruling di-
rected that a 12-year-old African American girl be admitted to her 
neighborhood school, stating that “‘the law makes no distinc-
tion as to the right of children . . . to attend the public schools.’” 
Emma Coger, an African American woman who had been re-
moved from a steamboat dining room, was granted the same 
rights and privileges as white passengers in the 1873 case, Coger 
v. The North Western Union Packet Co. In 1869 the Iowa Supreme 
Court was the first court in the nation to admit a woman, Ara-
bella A. Mansfield, to the practice of law. In State v. Walker (1921), 
the court was one of the first in the nation to reason that the 
Nineteenth Amendment made women eligible for jury service.82  
 Frederick White hoped to extend the court’s record of af-
firming civil rights. His challenge was to convince the court that 
the concept of loss of consortium remained valid while arguing 
that the justices should reject the structure of coverture, which 
provided the basis for the claim. If he overemphasized equality 
between husband and wife, the court could decide that neither 
husband nor wife could recover for loss of consortium. Maude 
would then not recover for her loss. In that context, White did 
not argue for a radical redefinition of gender roles in marriage. 
He focused on the love and affection in marriage and argued 
that each partner had equal rights to that love and affection. 
That argument was consistent with the Hitaffer court’s reason-
ing and the understanding of marriage in the 1950s.  
 In his brief, White emphasized the court’s opportunity to 
change an unjust law. He first sought to establish that a hus-
band in Iowa could recover for loss of consortium based on 
negligence. In doing so, White cited older cases based in the 
common law that emphasized affection and love in marriage.83 
In this way, White focused on affirming the central role of mar-
riage in society. 
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 White opened his argument by stating that the case was “a 
case of first impression,” which meant that the Iowa Supreme 
Court had not yet decided whether a wife could bring a loss of 
consortium claim based on negligence. He presented the case as 
an opportunity for the judges to affirm the cultural understand-
ing of marriage at that time and declare coverture dead. White 
stated that all reasons for denying wives the claim went “back 
to an era when a husband was not only lord and master of his 
household but was the only medium through which his wife 
could enter the courts.” White painted the past as a barbaric 
time and the present as an enlightened era.84  
 White was careful not to challenge the institution of mar-
riage itself or the roles within marriage. In fact, White stated 
that the married women’s property acts did not change the 
nature of the duties of husband and wife. Instead, he said, 
those acts were evidence that legislatures intended for men and 
women to have equal rights before the law. Equal legal rights 
would not entail restructuring the marital relationship; hus-
bands and wives would maintain distinct roles.85
 White made it clear that allowing wives to bring loss of con-
sortium claims based in negligence would affirm the marital 
relationship. He quoted from a previous Iowa Supreme Court 
decision that described the nature of marriage: “‘The marriage 
state is not one entered into for the purposes of labor and sup-
port alone. Considerations of the highest character, as the com-
fort and happiness of the parties . . . give to each the right to the 
affection, companionship, and society of the other.’”86 White 
deemphasized the economics of marriage and highlighted the 
social and relational aspects of marriage. That strategy avoided 
highlighting any possible disruption to marital roles and duties 
that giving wives the cause of action might create. White’s strat-
egy also stressed the ability of the loss of consortium award to 
affirm cultural values, which was an argument for continuing 
to grant loss of consortium awards to husbands and extending 
the right to wives. Denying both husbands and wives the claim 
might achieve equality, but it would not reflect cultural values. 
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White offered the court an opportunity to strengthen marriage 
by adding to the benefits of marriage. 
 Glenn Beers and R. Bruce Hughes, the attorneys for the de-
fendant, responded to White’s argument with numerous refer-
ences to cases denying wives the right to bring loss of consortium 
claims based on negligence.87 They noted that although no Iowa 
court had considered this particular issue, many courts had, and 
almost all had rejected White’s argument. They repeated reasons 
for denying the claim found in other decisions and stated that 
“a mere listing of the cited cases [was] persuasive.”88  
 Without a central theme in their brief, oral argument did not 
go well for Beers and Hughes. White remembers that the defense 
lawyers argued unsuccessfully that granting the claim to wives 
would result in too many cases for the courts to handle. White 
also believes that Beers and Hughes made a crucial mistake at 
oral argument by noting that all the justices had represented in-
surance companies. White thinks the judges did not appreciate 
the insinuation that they did not decide cases independently.89   
 The Iowa Supreme Court found White’s argument persua-
sive. The court reversed Judge Heath’s dismissal of the case and 
held that wives do have a claim for loss of consortium based 
on negligence. Norman Hays, who wrote the opinion for the 
majority, squarely addressed the defense attorneys’ reliance on 
previous case law. 
While we recognize the almost total lack of precedent for allowing 
appellant’s cause of action, we deem precedent to be worthy of 
support only when it can stand the scrutiny of logic and sound 
reasoning in the light of present-day standards and ideals. We 
think the reasoning and logic advanced in the Hitaffer case is 
sound; that the reasoning and logic advanced by the great weight 
of authority denying relief is not.90
The Iowa Supreme Court found that the married women’s prop-
erty acts had abolished coverture. The court also concluded that 
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consortium referred to love and affection rather than an eco-
nomic exchange. White’s focus on contrasting wives’ rights in 
the modern era with wives’ rights under coverture was a suc-
cessful strategy; the court emphasized that contrast throughout 
its decision.91
 Judge Hays found the contrast between current values and 
the values embedded in the concept of coverture especially 
striking. He described coverture as an “archaic rule” where “the 
husband and wife were considered as one, and he was the one.” 
He declared that “a wife [was] no longer her husband’s chattel.” 
Using the terms “modern” and “today” several times in his 
opinion, Judge Hays indicated that the court’s opinion was 
based in present values that differed dramatically from the 
values of coverture. Despite finding coverture “archaic,” the 
court did not find the concept of loss of consortium, which had 
grown out of coverture, outdated.92 White had persuasively 
presented the case as an opportunity to strengthen marriage, 
and the court seized the opportunity to define the meaning of 
marriage for the “modern” era. 
 Four judges dissented.93 Henry Peterson, who wrote the 
dissenting opinion, emphasized that “the question involved in 
this case ha[d] been considered by the Supreme Court of at least 
twenty states” and only “two or three decisions” agreed with 
the majority while “more than fifty decisions” reached the op-
posite conclusion. He quoted at length from various decisions 
denying the wife the claim.94  
 Attorneys Beers and Hughes filed a petition for rehearing. 
They argued that “the decision of the majority would make 
Iowa an ‘island’ in the sea of judicial opinion.” The defense 
lawyers again argued that the legislature should decide the 
issue because it involved “very grave policy questions.” In his 
response, White cited Judge Benjamin Cardozo for the proposi-
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tion that changing the law when social customs changed was 
a judicial function. Agreeing with White, the court denied the 
petition for rehearing.95   
 Acuff v. Schmit was one of several cases in the mid-1950s in 
which the Iowa Supreme Court reversed precedent or decided 
a case differently from the majority of courts. This may have 
caused some consternation, for not long after the Acuff ruling, 
Judge Larson, who had sided with the majority in Acuff, pre-
pared a speech describing the court’s position with regard to 
stare decisis.   
The volume of overruled precedents has led to the query as to 
whether or not we are without hesitation in upsetting established 
rules to reach justice in the case at bar. I do not so consider the 
make-up of our court. While there are perhaps a liberal or two, 
and a conservative or two, on this court, I could not classify the 
group as either liberal or conservative in its far-reaching policies 
or objectives. District judges and lawyers have no hesitancy in 
contending for positions they believe are correct, and we do care-
fully consider their arguments.96
Larson discussed nine cases, including Acuff, filed between 
December 1955 and October 1956 in which the court’s decision 
was a reversal of precedent or a decision in conflict with other 
courts. The court, he claimed, was not interested in challenging 
current social mores, but it was committed to protecting the 
rights of every citizen.97  
 The Acuff decision reversed and remanded a ruling dismiss-
ing the case. Having established that a wife could claim loss of 
consortium, the Iowa Supreme Court directed District Court 
Judge Heath to hear the case. The case was set for trial in Octo-
ber 1957. Before the trial date, the insurance company offered to 
settle the case and Maude Acuff accepted.98 White recalled that 
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Glen and Maude Acuff celebrate their 50th anniversary, June 
28, 1990. Photo courtesy Fred Acuff. 
Maude did not want to go through the stress of a trial and felt 
“vindicated” by the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision. In Decem-
ber 1957 White filed a motion to dismiss.99
 
IN THE NEARLY FOUR-AND-A-HALF YEARS between 
Glen Acuff’s accident and the final resolution of Maude’s loss of 
consortium suit, Maude and Glen began rebuilding their family 
life. Maude became a “working woman,” advancing at Santa 
Claus Industries to the position of director of purchasing, a post 
she would hold until the company sold out in the mid-1960s. 
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Then, with the full responsibility of financial support for the 
family on her shoulders, Maude answered an ad for a medical 
records transcriber at St. Francis Hospital. At the hospital she 
worked her way up to the position of director of central ser-
vices, a title she proudly held until she retired in 1992.100
 At home, Glen was not idle. His sons became his arms and 
legs. With Glen providing supervision and direction, the boys 
remodeled the bathroom, cultivated and tended a truck garden, 
and canned vegetables. When the older boys moved on to other 
activities and left home, it fell to the youngest son, Fred, to re-
place them. He recalls boosting Glen onto the tractor to till the 
strawberries, following his father’s direction to set up a mobile 
home, and, when he was 14, getting both of his parents in the 
car when his mother suffered a minor heart attack and, under 
his father’s direction, driving to the hospital in Waterloo.101
 Eventually Glen began assisting neighbors with their taxes, 
an endeavor he gradually expanded into a part-time seasonal 
business. Although he was proud of Maude’s success at the jobs 
she held, the inability to support his family always ate at Glen. 
His son Fred put it this way: “One of the things my Dad’s gen-
eration was adamant about was that a man supports the family. 
. . . If there was one tough thing for my father when he broke 
his neck it was the idea that he couldn’t support his family the 
way he envisioned that he should.” Glen Acuff was 75 when he 
died on April 27, 1996. Maude died on August 20, 2010.102
 Acuff v. Schmit established Frederick White’s reputation as 
an attorney who was willing, once he took a case, to follow 
through to appeal if appropriate. Following the Acuff decision, 
Yale Law School placed the case in its moot court program, and 
White received inquiries from plaintiff and defense lawyers 
seeking to understand how he had developed his argument.103 
White was well on his way to becoming a respected member of 
the Iowa Bar and establishing a general practice that extended 
across 50 years.  
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AFTER THE IOWA SUPREME COURT decided Acuff in 
1956, courts around the country gradually allowed wives to 
bring loss of consortium claims based on negligence.104 Progress 
was uneven and slow; in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, most 
states decided that the wife could recover, but some courts con-
tinued to issue decisions denying wives the claim, and as late as 
1997 six states still denied recovery for the wife while granting it 
to the husband.105 Today all jurisdictions in the United States 
allow both husbands and wives to recover for loss of consor-
tium based in negligence. In contrast, in England, where the 
loss of consortium claim and the doctrine of coverture origi-
nated, “courts came to regard all actions for loss of consortium 
as misconceived.” In the United States, the debate between 
judges who would allow the claim and those who would deny 
it was at times lively, and the reasons judges gave for their posi-
tions illustrate the nuances in views on marriage and women in 
the mid–twentieth century.106   
 The forceful dissenting opinions in two cases denying re-
covery show how a wife’s right to the loss of consortium claim 
could be alternately framed as an equality issue or as a decision 
on the significance of marriage and its definition. In Deshotel v. 
Atchison, decided in 1958, the Supreme Court of California re-
fused to allow the wife to recover for loss of consortium. Judge 
Jesse Carter, who wrote “frequent and outspoken” dissents, de-
clared the majority’s opinion “neither logical nor sound”; he 
could see no difference between a husband’s loss of consortium 
and a wife’s loss of consortium. He argued that the court’s deci-
sion was “a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by both the federal and State constitutions.” He believed that 
marriage gave the parties rights that, when destroyed, deserved 
compensation. Carter described the wife’s loss in dramatic terms: 
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“In place of a healthy, normal husband she now has a hope-
lessly bedridden invalid.” His reasoning reflected sentiments 
expressed in other cases, but, unlike the judges in many of those 
other cases, he explicitly named the denial of the claim a denial 
of equal protection. He saw the case through the lens of gender 
equality.107
 In Neuberg v. Bobowicz, decided in 1960, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania also refused to allow the wife to recover for loss 
of consortium, finding that the action was, “at best, a vague, 
indefinable and embarrassing left-over from another day and 
age.” Judge Michael Musmanno, also well known for his dis-
senting opinions, wrote a lengthy dissent in which he expressed 
outrage at the majority’s opinion, which he believed “reduce[d] 
the holy relationship of married life to one of a mere business 
partnership.” Judge Musmanno saw Neuberg as a case about 
whether to strengthen or weaken “the most respected relation-
ship in civilization, the marriage relationship.” Judge Mus-
manno celebrated gender roles within marriage and believed 
the married women’s property acts strengthened that structure.  
The remedial legislation [married women’s property acts] was not 
aimed at toppling over the husband. The husband is still the head 
of the household, he is still the person responsible for the security 
of the home, he is still the protector of his wife and children, all of 
which, of course, he should be. . . . The remedial legislation . . . has 
increased rather than diminished the strength of the bonds of mu-
tuality between her and husband. If it did not do that, it could 
scarcely be regarded as ‘remedial.’ Anything which weakens the 
marital status is catastrophic, not remedial. 
Denying the wife recovery for loss of consortium was denying 
the sanctity of marriage and its significance in society.108  
 Judge Musmanno contrasted his definition of marriage with 
the majority’s definition, concluding that gender was irrelevant 
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in the majority’s definition. He lamented that “it used to be that 
when Mary Quadrille married John Cabot they truly became Mr. 
and Mrs. Cabot. Under today’s decision, the wedded couple 
will become Quadrille & Cabot, Partnership.”109 In his formula-
tion, gender matters; the couple would use “Mr.” and “Mrs.” in 
Musmanno’s ideal marriage. The couple would also share the 
same name. Under the majority’s definition of marriage, gender 
is irrelevant and the couple retains their separate names. Mus-
manno argued that denying the wife recovery actually destroyed 
gender roles, while allowing recovery would strengthen them. 
 Judge Musmanno also emphasized the distinctive nature of 
the wife’s loss. Believing that the family was “the flesh and 
blood of our American civilization,” Musmanno asked how de-
priving the “sacred right to motherhood” could “mean nothing 
to the law.” He believed that a woman was entitled to “comfort, 
companionship, society and love” when she “[gave] up her 
home and family” to join her husband.110 Her loss of consortium 
was a gendered loss. The different approaches of Judges Carter 
and Musmanno reflected conflicting cultural responses to the 
changing nature of marriage and gender roles. 
 Indeed, in the 1950s, when many families were separated 
from extended family and other social ties and wives often 
stayed at home, the loss of a husband’s companionship would 
have been a significant loss. The expansion of suburbs “weak-
ened extended-family ties . . . and fostered a style of life based 
on traditional gender roles in the home.”111 Weakened ties be-
tween extended family members elevated the significance of 
marriage in people’s lives. The Iowa Supreme Court and other 
courts decided loss of consortium cases in the context of a cul-
ture where the importance of marriage was growing. 
 An inability to have children was also particularly signifi-
cant to women at that time. As Elaine Tyler May explains, “The 
message in the popular culture was clear: Motherhood was the 
ultimate fulfillment of female sexuality and the primary source 
of a woman’s identity.”112 According to Judge Musmanno, al-
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lowing the wife to recover for loss of consortium recognized 
and celebrated the traditional gender structure the wife had lost 
in her marriage through the injury to her husband. 
 Arguments based in the concept of equality could have led 
to widespread abolition of the loss of consortium action alto-
gether, but the cultural background of the 1950s provided 
judges with persuasive reasons to allow wives to recover. Later 
cases more clearly addressed the concept of equality, but judges 
decided those cases in the context of the earlier cases.113 Acuff 
and other early cases established authority that later judges 
could rely upon.   
 
THE LEGAL RIGHTS of wives have been extended in the 
years since Acuff, but economic equality between men and 
women remains elusive. Because women remain largely re-
sponsible for household labor and care of dependents and be-
cause the “ideal employee” is often expected to be available for 
full-time and overtime work, women often remain dependent 
on men.114 The effects of coverture in shaping marital roles persist. 
 The judges who allowed wives to recover for loss of consor-
tium recognized a wife’s disadvantage before the law, but they 
did not question the inequality inherent in the economic struc-
ture of the marital relationship. Despite the focus on love and 
affection in marriage in many decisions, the result of allowing a 
wife to bring a loss of consortium claim was a monetary award. 
That monetary award was an acknowledgment of the inequality 
of economic opportunity facing a wife who struggled to sup-
port the family after her husband could no longer provide that 
support. Because Maude Acuff’s monetary award was small, 
she needed to get a job outside the home, which reversed gen-
der roles in the marriage. However, a monetary award does 
contribute to a wife’s ability to maintain the traditional eco-
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nomic structure of the marital relationship. In this way, a mone-
tary award may reinforce the wife’s role as a dependent. 
 Allowing a wife to recover for loss of consortium allowed 
the state to “pass the costs of welfare on to private individuals.”115 
If a wife received money from a private citizen for the conse-
quences of a disruption in her marital relationship, her family 
would not be forced to rely heavily on the state for economic 
assistance. This recovery added to the benefits of marriage, an 
institution itself designed to ensure that the state does not have 
to pay these costs, according to Martha Fineman. Fineman ar-
gues that “the institution of the family frees the market to act 
without consideration or accommodation for dependency.” As 
Joan Williams puts it, “Mothers marginalize to enable fathers to 
perform as ideal workers.” This family structure perpetuates 
gender inequality by assigning care for dependents to women, 
who are then unable to perform as “ideal workers” in the econ-
omy in the way that men can. Allowing a wife to recover for 
loss of consortium made sense within a system designed to en-
sure that the state would not be responsible for dependents.116  
 Decisions allowing wives to bring loss of consortium claims 
did not radically restructure gender roles or question the in-
stitution of marriage. These decisions did, however, reflect a 
change in the cultural understanding of marriage in the mid–
twentieth century. Previously seen as an economic exchange, 
marriage now also signaled companionship and romantic and 
sexual love; it became one of the principal sources of emotional 
support in many people’s lives.   
 The Iowa Supreme Court decided Acuff in the context of a 
culture that celebrated marriage as the primary relationship 
in people’s lives. This cultural background made possible the 
gradual emergence of the wife’s right to loss of consortium 
based on negligence. Courts could have rejected the claim for 
both wives and husbands by finding the claim rooted in out-
dated concepts. Instead, they found the claim relevant. Marriage 
and the common understanding of its significance in the culture 
were central themes in the decisions allowing wives to bring 
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loss of consortium claims. The cultural landscape of the 1950s, 
when marriage defined people’s lives, allowed for the continua-
tion and expansion of the loss of consortium claim. 
